

A Normative Legal Analysis of the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement in Securing National Vital Objects in Ambon City

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Abstrak

Penelitian ini menganalisis efektivitas penegakan hukum dalam pengamanan Objek Vital Nasional (Obvitnas) di Kota Ambon dengan menitikberatkan pada efektivitas sarana dan prasarana Polri serta pembagian kewenangan antara Polri dan pengelola Obvitnas. Penelitian menggunakan metode yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan konseptual, dengan menganalisis UUD NRI Tahun 1945, Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2002 tentang Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, serta Keputusan Presiden Nomor 63 Tahun 2004 tentang Pengamanan Objek Vital Nasional. Analisis juga menggunakan konsep efektivitas hukum, proporsionalitas, akuntabilitas, risk-based security, dan pembagian tanggung jawab kelembagaan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa pengamanan Obvitnas dibangun atas konstruksi tanggung jawab yang terbagi secara proporsional. Pengelola Obvitnas memiliki tanggung jawab utama dalam penyelenggaraan keamanan internal, sedangkan Polri berfungsi memberikan bantuan pengamanan, melakukan penegakan hukum, dan merespons ancaman sesuai kebutuhan operasional serta tingkat risiko. Efektivitas pengamanan tidak semata-mata ditentukan oleh jumlah personel atau ketersediaan fasilitas, tetapi oleh kesesuaian antara kewenangan, tanggung jawab, tingkat ancaman, dan kapasitas operasional. Keterbatasan kendaraan operasional dan sistem komunikasi di wilayah Ambon dan Maluku dapat menghambat mobilitas, koordinasi, dan sistem peringatan dini. Oleh karena itu, pengalokasian sarana dan prasarana harus didasarkan pada penilaian ancaman yang berkelanjutan dan karakteristik geografis wilayah kepulauan.

Kata kunci: efektivitas hukum; Objek Vital Nasional; Polri.

Abstract

This article examines law-enforcement effectiveness in securing National Vital Objects in Ambon City through allocation of institutional responsibility, risk-based security, operational capacity, and the limits of drawing empirical effectiveness conclusions from normative legal research. It uses normative legal research and a structured analysis of applicable legal materials, supported by comparative and interdisciplinary scholarship where relevant. The revised analysis distinguishes legal design from empirical claims and identifies the principal regulatory or institutional gap. The study finds that existing law provides important but fragmented safeguards and that legal certainty depends on clearer decision criteria, procedural accountability, and proportionate remedies. It proposes an operational framework that specifies legal thresholds, institutional responsibilities, safeguards, and review mechanisms. The article contributes a more explicit research gap, a reproducible doctrinal method, and

a policy model calibrated to legality, proportionality, accountability, and rights protection.

Keywords: *legal effectiveness; National Vital Objects; Indonesian National Police;*

INTRODUCTION

Constitutionally, the security of vital objects concerns two legal interests that must be reconciled in a balanced manner. First, the state is under an obligation to guarantee public security and order, including the continuity of public services and the protection of strategic infrastructure. Second, every person has the right to protection of their person, honor, dignity, and property under their control, as well as the right to security against threats and fear. In addition, Article 30 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia positions the Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia or Polri) as a state instrument entrusted with maintaining public security and order, protecting, serving, and providing assistance to the public, as well as enforcing the law.¹ Accordingly, the security of vital objects should not be understood merely as an exercise of spatial control or the protection of state assets, but rather as the implementation of the state's constitutional obligations, which remain subject to respect for citizens' rights.²

From the perspective of the rule of law, the security of vital objects must comply with the principles of legality, legal certainty, proportionality, accountability, and respect for human rights. The principle of legality requires every action undertaken by law-enforcement authorities to have a clear legal basis in legislation.³ The principle of proportionality requires security measures, access restrictions, dispersal of crowds, removal of blockades, or other coercive measures to be undertaken only to the extent necessary to address actual threats and not to exceed what is reasonably required in light of the level of disturbance encountered. Meanwhile, the principle of accountability requires every security measure to be legally, administratively, ethically, and professionally reviewable and justifiable.⁴

Accordingly, the effectiveness of law enforcement in securing vital objects cannot be measured solely by indicators such as the reduction of security disturbances or the prevention of criminal offenses.⁵ Effectiveness must instead be assessed on the basis of the conformity of actions undertaken by law-enforcement

¹ Carlos, Yosua Eurico Warenstein, Burhan Niode, and Welly Waworundeng. "The Effectiveness of Public Services by the Indonesian National Police in Enhancing the Security of Vital Objects in Manado City." *Journal of Public Administration and Government*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2023).

² Admin Admin. "Pengamanan Objek Vital Polri." *Jurnal Litbang Polri* 22, no. 2 (2019): 1-59 <https://jlp.puslitbang.polri.go.id/jlp/LitbangPOLRI/article/view/14>

³ Maisa, Moh. Didi Permana, and Abd. Wahid Milsan L. "Peran Satuan Samapta Bhayangkara dalam Mencegah Tindak Pidana Pencurian di Wilayah Objek Vital Nasional Kabupaten Morowali Utara." *Jurnal Kolaboratif Sains* 7, no. 6 (2024). <https://doi.org/10.56338/jks.v7i6.5505>

⁴ Yono Sugi Anom Darmawan, Christhalia Emmanuel Tanra, Nabil Fawwaz Zakie, and Amelian Karima Eliana, "Addressing Legal Problems of Handling Cryptocurrency Money Laundering Crimes in Indonesia: The Dualism Regime between Law No. 8 of 2010 and Bappebti Regulation No. 8 of 2021," *KLAUSULA: Jurnal Hukum Tata Negara, Administrasi dan Pidana* 5, no. 1 (April 2026): 59. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.32503/klausula.v5i1.8884>

⁵ Soekanto, Soerjono. *Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi Penegakan Hukum*. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2018.

authorities and vital-object operators with the legal norms governing who is authorized, with respect to which objects such authority is exercised, in what form such authority may be exercised, and through what procedures such actions may be legally justified and held accountable.

Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police establishes the police function as a function of state administration in the fields of maintaining public security and order, law enforcement, protection, public assistance, and public service.⁶ Article 13 of the aforementioned Law stipulates three principal duties of the Indonesian National Police: maintaining public security and order, enforcing the law, and providing protection, assistance, and services to the public.

Normatively, these duties demonstrate that the security of vital objects encompasses three inseparable dimensions. First, the dimension of maintaining public security and order through preventive measures, guarding, patrols, access control, surveillance, and early detection. Second, the dimension of law enforcement where there are indications of criminal offenses, such as theft of assets, damage to installations, threats, violence, or other unlawful acts that obstruct the operation of vital objects. Third, the dimension of protection and public service, namely the obligation of the Indonesian National Police to ensure that security measures do not instead generate fear, create new conflicts, or result in violations of the rights of communities surrounding vital objects.

Article 14 paragraph (1) of Law Number 2 of 2002 provides a legal basis for the Indonesian National Police to conduct regulation, guarding, escorting, and patrol activities; maintain public order and guarantee public security; coordinate, supervise, and provide technical guidance concerning forms of community-based security arrangements; conduct investigations and criminal inquiries; and protect lives, property, communities, and the environment from disturbances to public order.⁷ This provision indicates that the security of vital objects does not merely concern the deployment of police personnel, but also encompasses the development and supervision of internal security systems implemented by vital-object operators and security units.⁸

Nevertheless, such authority is not unlimited. Article 18 of Law Number 2 of 2002 indeed provides police officers with discretionary authority to act according to their own judgment in the public interest. However, such discretion may only be exercised under circumstances of compelling necessity, with due regard to applicable legislation and the Professional Code of Ethics of the Indonesian National Police.⁹ Furthermore, Article 19 requires every police officer to act on the basis of

⁶ Republic of Indonesia, Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police, arts. 5, 13–14.

⁷ Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2002 tentang Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Pasal 13, Pasal 14 ayat (1), Pasal 15, Pasal 16, Pasal 18, dan Pasal 19; Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana, Pasal 1 angka 1, Pasal 1 angka 2, dan Pasal 7 ayat (1).

⁸ Ibid., 9

⁹ Yollanda and Emmilia Rusdiana, "Makna Klausul 'Keadaan yang Sangat Perlu' Pasal 18 Ayat (2) UU Kepolisian dalam Penggunaan Diskresi Kepolisian," *Indonesian Journal of Contemporary Law* 2, no. 3 (2026). <https://journal.unesa.ac.id/index.php/ijcl/article/view/56721>.

legal norms, observe religious, social, and moral norms, and uphold human rights; the Indonesian National Police is also required to prioritize preventive measures.¹⁰

Accordingly, security measures undertaken in response to disturbances at vital objects must be preceded by an assessment of the type of threat, level of risk, nature of the disturbance, its impact on public services, and the possibility that the rights or interests of members of the public may be affected.¹¹ The use of repressive measures may only be justified where persuasive, preventive, and procedural measures are no longer adequate, or where circumstances objectively require law-enforcement action.¹²

Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 expressly does not place responsibility for the security of National Vital Objects exclusively upon the Indonesian National Police. Article 4 paragraph (1) stipulates that the operator of a National Vital Object is responsible for organizing the security of its respective vital object on the basis of an internal security principle. Meanwhile, Article 4 paragraph (2) stipulates that the Indonesian National Police is obliged to provide security assistance for National Vital Objects.¹³

This legal construction entails the consequence that the security of a vital object constitutes the primary responsibility of the vital-object operator, whereas the Indonesian National Police performs a supporting security function according to the needs and level of threat involved. Accordingly, deficiencies in internal security systems such as the absence of CCTV, inadequate fencing or lighting, weak access-control mechanisms, the absence of incident-reporting procedures, or insufficient training for security personnel cannot, in principle, automatically be attributed entirely to the Indonesian National Police. The vital-object operator retains a normative obligation to establish an adequate internal security system.

Article 5 of Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 expressly provides that National Vital Object operators and the Indonesian National Police jointly determine the standard security configuration for each vital object, including the required personnel strength and security facilities and infrastructure. This provision also requires the operator and the Indonesian National Police to conduct periodic security-system audits. Accordingly, CCTV systems, access-control mechanisms, lighting, security fencing, guard posts, patrols, emergency procedures, and incident-reporting systems are not merely managerial requirements; rather, they form part

¹⁰ Doni Hafendi and Wilma Silalahi, "Diskresi Sebagai Instrumen Penegakan Hukum: Kajian terhadap Kewenangan Kepolisian Berdasarkan UU Kepolisian," *Jurnal Hukum Lex Generalis* 5, no. 12 (2025), <https://ojs.rewangrencang.com/index.php/JHLG/article/view/1443>

¹¹ International Committee of the Red Cross. "International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts." *International Review of the Red Cross* 106, no. 927 (2024): 1357–1450. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S181638312400064X>

¹² Sasmita, Susi, Sahuri Lasmadi, and Erwin. "Penegakan Hukum Pidana terhadap Polisi yang Melakukan Kekerasan terhadap Para Pengunjuk Rasa." *PAMPAS: Journal of Criminal Law* 3, no. 3 (2022): 249–263. <https://doi.org/10.22437/pampas.v3i3.20748>.

¹³ Raslin, Harvin, Septi Astuti, Agung Shamsudin Saragih, Ary Wahyono, and Gadang Priyotomo. "Evaluasi Mutu Sarana dan Prasarana Polri untuk Pengamanan Objek Vital dalam Rangka Pengamanan Pemilu 2024." *Jurnal Litbang Polri* 27, no. 2 (2024). <https://doi.org/10.46976/litbangpolri.v27i2.247>

of the standard security configuration that must, normatively, be jointly determined and evaluated.¹⁴

The obligation of the Indonesian National Police to deploy security forces is likewise neither absolute nor uniform. Article 6 of Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 provides that the Indonesian National Police shall deploy security forces on the basis of operational needs and assessments of potential threats and/or disturbances.¹⁵ Accordingly, the number of personnel, form of security measures, frequency of patrols, use of technology, and coordination mechanisms must be grounded in an accountable risk assessment.

Under certain circumstances, the Indonesian National Police may request assistance from the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI) in accordance with applicable legislation. However, the involvement of the TNI cannot be understood as an automatic transfer of civilian security responsibilities to the defense institution. Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 distinguishes between TNI assistance that may be requested by the Indonesian National Police in securing National Vital Objects and the security of vital objects that are organically part of the TNI institutional environment, which remains the responsibility of the TNI. Therefore, research should avoid assuming that the Indonesian National Police, TNI, security personnel, and vital-object operators possess identical authority in every situation involving a security disturbance.¹⁶

A key juridical point requiring further clarification in cases involving blockades or land claims in the Lalier, Passo area is that a land dispute does not, by itself, constitute a criminal case. Disputes concerning the origin of land rights, boundaries of land parcels, land sale and purchase transactions, the validity of certificates, physical possession, or claims based on family rights should, in principle, be resolved through land-law mechanisms, land-administration procedures, mediation, or civil litigation, depending on the nature of the dispute.¹⁷

The Indonesian National Police does not have the authority to determine the lawful owner of a parcel of land solely on the basis of a report submitted by one party, unilateral documentation, or temporary physical possession. The police may take measures to maintain public order, prevent violence, protect the public, and take action against conduct that objectively satisfies the elements of a criminal offense. However, security measures must not be used as an instrument to substitute for the evidentiary process concerning civil rights or the administrative process governing land matters.

Based on the background of this study, with the following research questions: How effective are the facilities and infrastructure available to the Indonesian

¹⁴ Ariprawira, Galih, Lessy Sutiyono Aji, Ade Wahyudin, and Alfin Hikmaturokhman. "Policy Mechanism for Security of National Vital Objects in the Telecommunications Sector in Indonesia." *Buletin Pos dan Telekomunikasi* 21, no. 2 (2023): 57–73. <https://doi.org/10.17933/bpostel.v21i2.379>

¹⁵ Republic of Indonesia. Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 concerning the Security of National Vital Objects. *State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia* Year 2004, No. 79. Jakarta, August 5, 2004.

¹⁶ Widjaja, Gunawan, Songga Aurora Abadi, and Anike Marandof. "Analisis terhadap Implementasi Keppres No. 63 Tahun 2004 di PT Freeport Indonesia." *Causa: Jurnal Hukum dan Kewarganegaraan* (2025). <https://doi.org/10.6679/k5qepa58>.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 18

National Police (*Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia* or Polri) in securing vital objects, particularly in Ambon City? What forms of synergy exist among the PAMOBVIT (Vital Object Security Unit), the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), and internal security personnel (SATPAM) in enforcing the security of vital objects?

The article's distinctive value lies not in claiming to measure operational effectiveness empirically, but in clarifying the legal allocation of security responsibility between National Vital Object operators and Polri and deriving a risk-based standard for assessing whether facilities, coordination, and response capacity are legally adequate in an archipelagic setting.

RESEARCH METHOD

This article uses normative juridical research with statutory and conceptual approaches. It does not independently measure police performance, equipment sufficiency, incident rates, or response times. Instead, it reconstructs the legal distribution of duties under the Police Law, Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004, implementing police rules, and related security standards, then evaluates the normative relevance of infrastructure, communication, mobility, accountability, and risk assessment. Statements about operational conditions in Ambon or Maluku are treated as secondary-source indications that illustrate implementation risks and are expressly distinguished from original field findings. Comparative critical-infrastructure literature is used as a conceptual benchmark for resilience and risk-based allocation.

Second, the conceptual approach is employed to examine the fundamental legal concepts underlying the security of National Vital Objects. This approach is used to clarify the meaning and legal implications of concepts such as *law enforcement*, *legal effectiveness*, *police discretion*, *proportionality*, *necessity*, *accountability*, *internal security*, and *risk-based security*. Second, the conceptual approach is employed to examine the fundamental legal concepts underlying the security of National Vital Objects. This approach is used to clarify the meaning and legal implications of concepts such as *law enforcement*, *legal effectiveness*, *police discretion*, *proportionality*, *necessity*, *accountability*, *internal security*, and *risk-based security*.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A Juridical Review of the Effectiveness of Police Facilities and Infrastructure in Securing Vital Objects in Ambon City

The security of vital objects constitutes an exercise of the policing function and cannot be separated from the constitutional position and legal authority of the Indonesian National Police (*Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia* or Polri). Constitutionally, Article 30 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia establishes Polri as a state instrument responsible for maintaining public security and order, protecting, serving, and assisting the public, and enforcing the law.¹⁸ This constitutional mandate is subsequently elaborated through Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police, which establishes the institutional framework, functions, duties, and authorities of Polri.

¹⁸ Republic of Indonesia, The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, art. 30(4).

Article 13 of Law Number 2 of 2002 establishes three principal duties of Polri: maintaining public security and order, enforcing the law, and providing protection, assistance, and services to the public. Article 14 further translates these general duties into operational functions, including regulating, guarding, escorting, and patrolling community and governmental activities as necessary; undertaking activities to ensure security and public order; fostering public participation and legal awareness; coordinating, supervising, and providing technical guidance concerning forms of community-based security; and conducting criminal investigations and inquiries.¹⁹ Accordingly, the statutory construction of police authority demonstrates that the security function is not limited to responding to disturbances after they occur, but also encompasses preventive and protective measures designed to anticipate and mitigate potential threats.

Within this legal framework, the security of vital objects should therefore not be understood merely as the physical guarding of particular buildings, installations, or facilities. Rather, it constitutes a multidimensional exercise of police authority encompassing preventive, law-enforcement, and protective functions. The preventive dimension includes patrols, guarding, surveillance, early detection, access control, and the development of security systems.²⁰ The law-enforcement dimension becomes relevant where conduct objectively satisfies the elements of a criminal offense and therefore requires investigation or other lawful enforcement measures. Meanwhile, the protective and public-service dimensions require police action to be conducted within the limits of statutory authority and with due regard for the rights and legitimate interests of members of the public.

This construction is further particularized through Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 concerning the Security of National Vital Objects. The Decree establishes a specific legal regime for the protection of National Vital Objects (*Objek Vital Nasional* or Obvitnas), which are defined in relation to areas, locations, buildings, installations, and/or undertakings that concern the livelihood of large numbers of people, state interests, and/or strategically important sources of state revenue.²¹ Within this framework, security encompasses efforts directed toward the prevention, deterrence, mitigation, and law enforcement against threats and disturbances affecting National Vital Objects.

The special legal regime established by Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 has an important consequence for the exercise of police authority: the security of a National Vital Object must be based upon its legally recognized status, its particular characteristics, and the threats and disturbances that may affect it. Consequently, the mere factual importance of a facility to the public does not, in itself, automatically establish the facility as a National Vital Object for legal purposes. Its status must derive from the applicable legal and administrative framework. This distinction is essential because the exercise of police authority must be grounded in

¹⁹ Republic of Indonesia. Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police. State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia, 2002, No. 2.

²⁰ Ariprawira, Galih, Lessy Sutiyono Aji, Ade Wahyudin, and Alfin Hikmaturokhman. "Policy Mechanism for Security of National Vital Objects in the Telecommunications Sector in Indonesia." Buletin Pos dan Telekomunikasi 21, no. 2 (2023): 57-73. <https://doi.org/10.17933/bpostel.v21i2.379>.

²¹ Republic of Indonesia. Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 concerning the Security of National Vital Objects. State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 2004, No. 79.

a legally identifiable object and a corresponding legal mandate, rather than merely in an institutional or factual perception that a particular facility is important.²²

From an institutional perspective, the Directorate of Vital Object Security (*Direktorat Pengamanan Objek Vital* or Ditpamobvit) of the Maluku Regional Police (*Polda Maluku*) performs the specialized police function of securing vital objects within its jurisdiction. The findings of this research indicate that such functions are implemented through patrols, surveillance, security-guard training and development, coordination with vital-object operators, security-system audits, and early-warning activities. These practices are substantively consistent with the preventive and protective dimensions of police authority established under Law Number 2 of 2002.²³

Nevertheless, the legal construction of National Vital Object security requires a fundamental distinction between police authority and the security responsibilities of the operators of vital objects. Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 does not establish a regime under which the entire responsibility for securing National Vital Objects is transferred to Polri. Rather, the regulation establishes a division of responsibility in which the operator retains responsibility for organizing internal security, while Polri provides security assistance within the scope of its statutory authority. The existence of Ditpamobvit should therefore be understood within a framework of shared security responsibility, rather than as an assumption by Polri of all security obligations belonging to the operator.²⁴

This distinction has direct implications for the assessment of legal effectiveness. Where deficiencies are identified in the internal security system of a vital object for example, inadequate CCTV coverage, insufficient access-control mechanisms, inadequate security personnel, or deficiencies in physical security infrastructure such deficiencies cannot automatically be attributed to Polri. The attribution of responsibility must first be determined by reference to the respective legal obligations, institutional authority, and functions assigned to each relevant actor. In other words, the effectiveness of police security measures cannot properly be assessed without simultaneously examining whether the operator has fulfilled its own legally prescribed internal-security responsibilities.

This allocation of responsibility is particularly significant because the security of a National Vital Object is structurally dependent upon the interaction between internal security mechanisms maintained by the operator and police security assistance provided by Polri. The effectiveness of one component cannot necessarily compensate for the failure of another. A sophisticated police response system, for example, cannot entirely substitute for deficiencies in access control, perimeter security, internal surveillance, or the preparedness of the operator's security personnel. Conversely, a well-developed internal security system cannot eliminate the statutory role of Polri in maintaining public order and enforcing criminal law

²² Awaloedin Djamin. *Sistem Pengamanan Swakarsa dan Dinamika Ilmu Kepolisian*. Jakarta, 2005.

²³ Paeh, Andre Christianto. "Peran Unit PAM OBVIT Polres Magelang dalam Pengamanan Objek Vital Nasional Candi Borobudur." *Police Studies Review* 8, no. 5. <https://doi.org/10.70526/psr.v8i5.8>

²⁴ Arief, Barda Nawawi. *Masalah Penegakan Hukum dan Kebijakan Hukum Pidana dalam Penanggulangan Kejahatan*. Jakarta, 2007.0

where a disturbance exceeds the capacity or authority of the internal security apparatus.²⁵

Accordingly, the assessment of effectiveness in this study should not be reduced to the question of whether security disturbances have decreased. A more appropriate normative-juridical assessment examines whether the exercise of authority, allocation of responsibility, institutional capacity, and security resources conform to the legal framework governing National Vital Objects. Effectiveness therefore involves the relationship between the legal mandate and its practical realization.

In this respect, Soerjono Soekanto's theory of legal effectiveness provides a relevant analytical framework, particularly through its emphasis on the factors of law, law-enforcement personnel, facilities and infrastructure, society, and culture. For the purposes of this research, the factors concerning law-enforcement personnel and facilities are particularly relevant because the existence of legally valid police authority does not, by itself, guarantee effective implementation. The realization of legal norms also depends upon the institutional capacity of the officers responsible for their implementation and the adequacy of the facilities and infrastructure supporting their functions.

Consequently, the effectiveness of Polri in securing vital objects should be evaluated through at least three interconnected dimensions. First, legal validity, namely whether the authority exercised by Polri has a clear and legitimate basis in the applicable legal framework. Second, institutional implementation, namely whether such authority is exercised by the institution legally competent to perform the relevant function and through procedures consistent with applicable regulations. Third, operational effectiveness, namely whether the personnel, facilities, technology, communication systems, and coordination mechanisms available are sufficient to enable the legally mandated security function to be performed effectively.

This framework demonstrates that limitations in security facilities and infrastructure should not automatically be characterized as violations of law. Rather, they become a matter of legal effectiveness where such limitations materially impede the implementation of a function that the law requires the police institution to perform. Thus, the relevant question is not simply whether Polri possesses operational vehicles, communication equipment, surveillance technology, or other security facilities, but whether those resources are adequate and proportionate to the security needs and threat levels of the vital objects under its jurisdiction.²⁶

Accordingly, the effectiveness of the security function performed by Ditpamobvit Polda Maluku should be assessed through the correspondence between legal mandate, institutional authority, internal-security responsibility,

²⁵ Pudi Rahardi. *Hukum Kepolisian: Profesionalisme dan Reformasi Polri*. Surabaya: Laksbang Mediatama, 2007.

²⁶ Muhammad Rustamaji, Shalih Mangara Sitompul, and Aldi Rizki Khoiruddin, "Reforming the Role of Judges in Assessing Evidence Authenticity and Legality: A Comparative Study Using the Exclusionary Rule Approach," *Media Iuris* 9, no. 1 (February 2026): 153-180, <https://doi.org/10.20473/mi.v9i1.77218>

threat assessment, operational capacity, and available security infrastructure.²⁷ This approach prevents the analysis from reducing the effectiveness of law enforcement to a purely quantitative assessment of personnel or equipment. Instead, it places the effectiveness of vital-object security within a broader normative framework in which the legality of authority, the distribution of institutional responsibility, the adequacy of resources, and the capacity to prevent and respond to threats must operate together.

This legal construction becomes more specific in the context of National Vital Objects through Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 concerning the Security of National Vital Objects. The Presidential Decree defines a National Vital Object as an area/location, building/installation, and/or undertaking that concerns the livelihood of large numbers of people, state interests, and/or strategically important sources of state revenue. The security of National Vital Objects encompasses all efforts, activities, and measures undertaken for the prevention, deterrence, mitigation, and law enforcement against threats and disturbances directed at National Vital Objects.

Accordingly, the security of National Vital Objects must be implemented with reference to the object's legal status, its characteristics, and the level of threats to which it is exposed.²⁸ Not every facility that is factually important to the public automatically constitutes a National Vital Object in the legal sense.²⁹ Its status must be established pursuant to the applicable statutory instruments. This distinction is important to ensure that security authority is not exercised merely on the basis of a factual perception of an object's importance, but rather on the basis of the legal framework establishing its status and applicable security regime.

Institutionally, the Directorate of Vital Object Security (*Direktorat Pengamanan Objek Vital* or Ditpamobvit) of the Maluku Regional Police (*Polda Maluku*) performs the function of securing vital objects within the jurisdiction of Polda Maluku. The research findings indicate that this function is implemented through patrols, surveillance, security-guard training and development, coordination with vital-object operators, security-system audits, and early detection. Substantively, these activities are consistent with the construction of police authority established under Law Number 2 of 2002. Nevertheless, from a legal perspective, a distinction must be maintained between the authority of Polri and the responsibility of vital-object operators.³⁰ Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 does not establish a legal construction under which the entire responsibility for the security of National Vital Objects rests with Polri. Vital-object operators

²⁷ Sachoulidou, Athina. "A Typology of Automated Law Enforcement Systems Under EU Law: What Standards for Defence Rights?" *European Papers* 11, no. 1 (2026): 595–630. <https://doi.org/10.15166/2499-8249/884>

²⁸ Muhammad Redi and Halimatul Maryani, "Implementation of Security for National Vital Objects of PT. Pertamina (Persero) Region I - Medan, North Sumatra by the Directorate of Samapta, North Sumatra Regional Police," *Jurnal Meta Hukum* 4, no. 2 (2025): 238–247, <https://doi.org/10.47652/metahukum.v4i2.760>

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Suriadi, Tri Syafari, and Nam Rumkel, "Peran Direktorat Pengamanan Obyek Vital Kepolisian Daerah Maluku Utara dalam Pengamanan Kawasan Pertambangan (Studi pada PT. Nusa Halmahera Mineral)," *Khairun Law Journal* 3, no. 1 (September 2019): 33–44, <https://ejournal.unkhair.ac.id/index.php/kli/article/view/2890/1951>

retain responsibility for organizing internal security, while Polri provides security assistance. Accordingly, the existence of Ditpamobvit should be understood within a framework of shared security responsibility, rather than as an assumption of the entirety of the security responsibilities of vital-object operators.³¹

This legal construction has direct consequences for the assessment of effectiveness. Where deficiencies are identified, such as limited CCTV coverage, inadequate access-control systems, insufficient security personnel, or suboptimal internal security facilities, such deficiencies cannot automatically be attributed to Polri. Responsibility must first be determined by reference to the respective allocation of authority and obligations among the relevant legal subjects. In assessing effectiveness, Soerjono Soekanto's theory of legal effectiveness is relevant, particularly the factors concerning law-enforcement personnel and facilities or infrastructure.³² From this perspective, the effectiveness of law enforcement is determined not merely by the existence of legal norms, but also by the institutions and officers responsible for implementing those norms and by the facilities that enable their effective implementation.

Accordingly, effectiveness in this study should be assessed at three levels. First, legal validity, namely whether the authority to secure vital objects has a valid legal basis. Second, institutional implementation, namely whether such authority is exercised by the institution legally empowered to do so and through mechanisms consistent with the applicable legal framework. Third, operational effectiveness, namely whether personnel, facilities, technology, and coordination systems enable the legally mandated authority to be exercised effectively in practice.³³ Under this framework, limitations in facilities and infrastructure do not, in themselves, constitute violations of law. Such limitations become a problem of legal effectiveness where they prevent an authority that is normatively required to be exercised from being implemented optimally. The central question is therefore not merely whether Polri possesses security facilities, but whether the facilities available are adequate to enable the exercise of police authority in accordance with the security needs and threat levels of the respective vital objects.³⁴

The effectiveness of facilities and infrastructure for securing vital objects in Ambon City must therefore be analyzed by connecting the factual condition of available resources with the legal standards governing police authority and security requirements. The research indicates that the security of vital objects is influenced by the geographical characteristics of Maluku, the distribution of vital objects, personnel limitations, technological development, and the availability of security

³¹ Humas Polri, "Ditpamobvit Polda Maluku Utara Laksanakan Patroli Rutin di Kawasan Perkantoran Pemprov Malut," Humas Polri, <https://humas.polri.go.id/news/detail/2214468-ditpamobvit-polda-maluku-utara-laksanakan-patroli-rutin-di-kawasan-perkantoran-pemprov-malut>

³² Riza, Khairul, and Irpan Husein Lubis. "Legal Implications of Evidence Removal by Police: The Barelang Case Study." *Kajian Ilmiah Hukum dan Kenegaraan (KIHAN)* 4, no. 2 (2025): 99–109. <https://doi.org/10.35912/kihan.v4i2.4997>.

³³ Ade Rachmad Hidayat, Shexy Intan Pratama Sari, and Cholidah Utama, "Beyond Legality: Reframing Abuse of Authority through the Lens of Utility and Accountability in Administrative Law," *Multidisciplinary Research Studies in Social Sciences* 2, no. 1 (2026): 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.71312/mrscholar.v2i1.557>

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 9

facilities and infrastructure. The use of operational vehicles, communication equipment, CCTV, electronic access-control systems, alarms, and surveillance technologies demonstrates that security practices have developed from conventional guarding toward a more integrated security system. At the same time, the research identifies limitations in operational vehicles, communications, technological facilities, and the equitable distribution of security resources.

Normatively, Article 6 of Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 provides an important basis for determining the effectiveness of these facilities. The provision essentially establishes that the deployment of police security forces must be based on operational needs and assessments of potential threats and/or disturbances. This provision demonstrates that the security of National Vital Objects should not be based solely on a quantitative approach for example, the assumption that a greater number of personnel or vehicles necessarily produces greater effectiveness. Rather, security resources must correspond to the characteristics of the object and the level of risk involved.³⁵

From a normative perspective, therefore, the availability and reliability of security facilities and infrastructure including operational vehicles, communication systems, and surveillance technologies should not be regarded merely as matters of administrative completeness or logistical capacity. They constitute essential instruments for fulfilling the statutory mandate of Polri. Under Articles 13 and 14 of Law Number 2 of 2002, Polri is entrusted with maintaining public security and order and providing protection to the public. In the operational context of Ditpamobvit Polda Maluku, vehicles that are functional but insufficient in number directly affect the institution's ability to perform its preventive and repressive functions comprehensively. Restricted police mobility is therefore not merely an operational obstacle; it may reduce the effectiveness of the state's legal obligation to protect the continuity of vital objects that serve the public interest.

Communication systems occupy a central position in the implementation of police functions because the security of vital objects requires continuous coordination among field officers, command centers, vital-object operators, and relevant institutions. The research identifies the use of handheld radios, radio communication, official telephones, and integrated communication systems, although signal limitations remain in certain areas. From a legal-operational perspective, weaknesses in communication cannot be regarded merely as technical deficiencies. They may constitute operational barriers to the implementation of early-warning mechanisms and the timely exercise of police authority. The reliability of communication, particularly during emergencies, is therefore a significant indicator of whether information concerning a threat can be transmitted promptly and accurately to the authorities legally empowered to respond. Delayed

³⁵ Mohd. Hendy Wismar Syahputra, Irawan Harahap, and Yelia Nathassa Winstar, "Pelaksanaan Keputusan Presiden Nomor 63 Tahun 2004 tentang Pengamanan Obyek Vital Negara pada PT Pertamina Hulu Rokan (PT PHR) oleh Direktorat Pam Obvit Polda Riau," *Yustisi* 12, no. 2 (June 2025): 423–35, <https://ejournal.uika-bogor.ac.id/index.php/YUSTISI/article/download/18904/7102>

responses resulting from communication failures may weaken the state's capacity to prevent and address disturbances affecting vital objects.³⁶

From a normative legal perspective, the availability and reliability of security facilities and infrastructure such as operational vehicles, communication systems, and surveillance technologies cannot be regarded merely as matters of administrative completeness or technical logistics. Rather, they constitute vital instruments for fulfilling the statutory mandate. Pursuant to Articles 13 and 14 of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police, Polri is entrusted with the primary duties of maintaining public security and order and providing protection to the public. In the operational context of the Directorate of Vital Object Security (*Direktorat Pengamanan Objek Vital* or Ditpamobvit) of the Maluku Regional Police (*Polda Maluku*), the condition of operational vehicles, which are functional but not yet optimal, directly affects the institution's capacity to perform its preventive and repressive functions comprehensively. Impaired police mobility is therefore not merely an operational constraint but, from a legal perspective, may diminish the effectiveness of state protection in ensuring the continuity of vital objects that serve the public interest.³⁷

Furthermore, within the exercise of police functions, communication systems occupy a central position as the lifeline of coordination. Weaknesses or disruptions in communication signals in certain areas should not be viewed merely as technical problems; rather, they constitute a juridical-operational deficiency that may impair the early-warning system mandated by the applicable regulatory framework. Communication reliability, particularly in emergency situations, constitutes a key indicator of whether information concerning potential threats can be promptly transmitted to and acted upon by the authorities legally empowered to respond. Delays in response resulting from communication constraints may, in substantive terms, weaken the security guarantees required by law, given that the speed and accuracy of police action are critical to the effective prevention and mitigation of security disturbances.

Normative Juridical Analysis: The Construction of Proportional Responsibility in the Security of National Vital Objects

The security of vital objects constitutes one form of the exercise of the policing function and cannot be separated from the constitutional position and legal authority of the Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia or Polri). Constitutionally, the existence of Polri derives from Article 30 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which establishes the Indonesian National Police as a state instrument responsible for maintaining public security and order, protecting, serving, and assisting the public, and enforcing the

³⁶ Ali Masood et al., "Surveying Pervasive Public Safety Communication Technologies in the Context of Terrorist Attacks," *Physical Communication* 41 (2020): 101109, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.phycom.2020.101109>

³⁷ Gianclaudio Malgieri and Frank Pasquale, "Licensing High-Risk Artificial Intelligence: Toward Ex Ante Justification for a Disruptive Technology," *Computer Law & Security Review* 52 (2024): 105899, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2023.105899>.

law. These constitutional functions are further elaborated in Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police.³⁸

Article 13 of Law Number 2 of 2002 stipulates three principal duties of Polri: maintaining public security and order, enforcing the law, and providing protection, assistance, and services to the public. Article 14 subsequently provides more operational functions, including regulating, guarding, escorting, and patrolling community and governmental activities as necessary; undertaking activities to ensure security, order, and the smooth flow of traffic; fostering public participation and legal awareness; coordinating, supervising, and providing technical guidance to special police units, civil servant investigators, and forms of community-based security; and conducting criminal investigations and inquiries.

On the basis of this legal construction, the security of vital objects should not be understood merely as the physical guarding of particular buildings or installations. Rather, security constitutes an exercise of the policing function encompassing preventive, repressive, and public-service dimensions.³⁹ The preventive dimension is manifested through patrols, guarding, surveillance, early detection, development of security systems, and access control. The repressive dimension arises when conduct objectively satisfies the elements of a criminal offense and therefore requires law-enforcement measures. Meanwhile, the protection and public-service dimension requires all security measures to be implemented within the framework of law and with due respect for the rights of members of the public.

This legal construction becomes more specific in the context of National Vital Objects through Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 concerning the Security of National Vital Objects. The Presidential Decree defines a National Vital Object as an area/location, building/installation, and/or undertaking that concerns the livelihood of large numbers of people, state interests, and/or strategically important sources of state revenue. The security of National Vital Objects encompasses all efforts, activities, and measures undertaken for the prevention, deterrence, mitigation, and law enforcement against threats and disturbances directed at National Vital Objects.

Accordingly, the security of National Vital Objects must be implemented with reference to the object's legal status, its characteristics, and the level of threats to which it is exposed. Not every facility that is factually important to the public automatically constitutes a National Vital Object in the legal sense. Its status must be established pursuant to the applicable statutory instruments. This distinction is important to ensure that security authority is not exercised merely on the basis of a factual perception of an object's importance, but rather on the basis of the legal framework establishing its status and applicable security regime.

⁴⁰Institutionally, the Directorate of Vital Object Security (Direktorat Pengamanan Objek Vital or Ditpamobvit) of the Maluku Regional Police (Polda

³⁸ Universitas Gadjah Mada, "UGM Policy Expert Highlights Democratic Risks of Police Holding Civil Positions," January 8, 2026, <https://ugm.ac.id/en/news/ugm-policy-expert-highlights-democratic-risks-of-police-holding-civil-positions/>

³⁹ Ibid., 1

⁴⁰ Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, "I Gde Panjta Astawa Explains Police's Position as Main, Reserve, Supporting Components," January 18, 2022,

Maluku) performs the function of securing vital objects within the jurisdiction of Polda Maluku. The research findings indicate that this function is implemented through patrols, surveillance, security-guard training and development, coordination with vital-object operators, security-system audits, and early detection. Substantively, these activities are consistent with the construction of police authority established under Law Number 2 of 2002.⁴¹

From a normative juridical perspective, the legal architecture for the security of National Vital Objects (Obvitnas) in Indonesia is not built upon a state-centric paradigm that imposes absolute security responsibilities entirely on the state (in this case, Polri). Based on an examination of Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 concerning the Security of National Vital Objects, which also derives from Law Number 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police, the law establishes a construction of proportionally shared security responsibility.

In the doctrine of administrative and constitutional law, this construction gives rise to a strict demarcation of authority between two main legal subjects: the Obvitnas operators (as private legal entities or state-owned enterprises) and Polri (as a public security institution).⁴² The law positions Obvitnas operators as the subjects bearing the primary obligation to organize internal security, formulate standard security configurations, and provide protective infrastructure. On the other hand, the role of Polri, particularly through the Directorate of Vital Object Security (Ditpamobvit), is constructed as a companion authority, supervisor, and provider of security assistance. Polri is present to secure the outer perimeter, provide tactical assistance, and respond to threats whose escalation exceeds the internal security capacity of the vital object.

This separation of authority carries fundamental implications for assessing effectiveness and attributing legal liability. From the perspective of compliance law, if deficiencies are found within the security system—such as CCTV blind spots, weak access control systems, a lack of internal security personnel (Satpam), or malfunctioning detection facilities—such failures cannot automatically be delegated as Polri's failures.

The law demands that the attribution of responsibility be assessed on a case-by-case basis according to the respective obligations of each party. Deficiencies in internal infrastructure are strictly a form of managerial negligence or non-compliance by the Obvitnas operators with the security standards mandated by regulations. Blaming Polri for malfunctioning internal alarms or inadequate CCTV is a logical fallacy in law, as the authority to procure and maintain such facilities lies purely within the operator's jurisdiction.

In measuring the extent to which the norms of Presidential Decree 63/2004 are implemented, Soerjono Soekanto's theory of legal effectiveness provides a precise analytical tool. The existence of a law is merely dead text (law in abstracto)

https://en.mkri.id/news/details/2022-01-18/I_Gde_Panjta_Astawa_Explains_Police%E2%80%99s_Position_as_Main,_Reserve,_Supporting_Components

⁴¹ Suropto and Sudarmadi, "Effect of Liquidity, Earnings Management, and Tax Avoidance on Tax Aggressiveness of Manufacturing Companies in Indonesia," in 1st Virtual Workshop on Writing Scientific Article for International Publication Indexed SCOPUS (2022), 176–181, <https://doi.org/10.2478/9788366675827-032>

⁴² Ibid., 17



if it is not supported by two crucial factors: law enforcement personnel and facilities or infrastructure. In the context of Obvitnas security, these personnel and facilities are dualistic in nature.⁴³ It requires not only the professionalism of Ditpamobvit personnel and the tactical facilities of Polri, but the law also mandates the readiness of internal security personnel and the adequacy of facilities belonging to the Obvitnas operators.⁴⁴ The integration among legal norms, the integrity of law enforcement personnel, and the availability of facilities determines whether the protection of Obvitnas can operate effectively on an empirical level.

Accordingly, effectiveness in this study should be assessed at three levels. First, legal validity, namely whether the authority to secure vital objects has a valid legal basis. Second, institutional implementation, namely whether such authority is exercised by the institution legally empowered to do so and through mechanisms consistent with the applicable legal framework. Third, operational effectiveness, namely whether personnel, facilities, technology, and coordination systems enable the legally mandated authority to be exercised effectively in practice.⁴⁵

Three Pillars of Legal Effectiveness Evaluation Based on the arguments above, the legal evaluation of the Obvitnas security system must be approached through three hierarchical pillars of analysis:

1. Legal Validity: Examining whether security measures and troop deployments are based on valid norms, such as the Police Law, Presidential Decree 63/2004, and relevant Polri managerial guidelines. This ensures there is no abuse of power in the deployment of state forces.
2. Institutional Implementation: Assessing procedural compliance and the division of roles. Has Ditpamobvit carried out its function as security assistance without assuming the obligations that should be borne by the operators? This pillar measures whether cooperation mechanisms (such as the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding) between Polri and Obvitnas operators have been executed in accordance with the legal framework.
3. Operational Effectiveness: This constitutes a field test of legal norms. This pillar measures whether the statutory mandates and cooperation agreements are genuinely supported by personnel capacity, technological integration (CCTV, communications), and cross-institutional coordination systems. Effective law is law that operationally manages to prevent security disturbances. Through this approach, the issue of security is no longer viewed merely as a technical field issue, but rather as a matter of compliance with the hierarchy of norms, the distribution of legal obligations among subjects, and the managerial accountability of each institution.

Under this framework, limitations in facilities and infrastructure do not, in themselves, constitute violations of law. Such limitations become a problem of legal effectiveness where they prevent an authority that is normatively required to be exercised from being implemented optimally. The central question is therefore not

⁴³ Soekanto, Soerjono. *Efektivitas Hukum dan Peranan Sanksi*. Bandung: Remaja Karya, 1985.

⁴⁴ Soekanto, Soerjono. *Kegunaan Sosiologi Hukum bagi Kalangan Hukum*. Bandung: Alumni, 1981.

⁴⁵ Panggih Rangga Rahayu, Bama Adiyanto, Jentung Wisnu Murti, Aries Setiyono, and Mutia Evi Kristhy, "Legal Effectiveness and Legal Functions in Indonesia," *Journal of Political and Legal Sovereignty* 2, no. 1 (2024): 157–161, <https://doi.org/10.38142/jpls.v2i1.143>

merely whether Polri possesses security facilities, but whether the facilities available are adequate to enable the exercise of police authority in accordance with the security needs and threat levels of the respective vital objects.

The effectiveness of facilities and infrastructure for securing vital objects in Ambon City must therefore be analyzed by connecting the factual condition of available resources with the legal standards governing police authority and security requirements. The research indicates that the security of vital objects is influenced by the geographical characteristics of Maluku, the distribution of vital objects, personnel limitations, technological development, and the availability of security facilities and infrastructure. The use of operational vehicles, communication equipment, CCTV, electronic access-control systems, alarms, and surveillance technologies demonstrates that security practices have developed from conventional guarding toward a more integrated security system. At the same time, the research identifies limitations in operational vehicles, communications, technological facilities, and the equitable distribution of security resources.

Normatively, Article 6 of Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 provides an important basis for determining the effectiveness of these facilities. The provision essentially establishes that the deployment of police security forces must be based on operational needs and assessments of potential threats and/or disturbances. This provision demonstrates that the security of National Vital Objects should not be based solely on a quantitative approach—for example, the assumption that a greater number of personnel or vehicles necessarily produces greater effectiveness. Rather, security resources must correspond to the characteristics of the object and the level of risk involved.⁴⁶

a. Operational Vehicles

Operational vehicles constitute an important instrument for supporting patrols, personnel mobility, responses to security disturbances, and security operations involving geographically dispersed objects. In the context of Maluku, whose geographical characteristics are predominantly archipelagic, mobility requirements are more complex than in geographically integrated regions.

The research findings indicate that operational vehicles have supported security activities, but their number and distribution remain limited in comparison with the geographical area and the number of objects requiring protection. This condition must be assessed in light of Article 6 of Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004. The relevant legal question is therefore not whether the number of vehicles satisfies a predetermined numerical standard, but whether the vehicles available are commensurate with security requirements based on the level of threat.

Accordingly, the effectiveness of operational vehicles may be assessed on the basis of their capacity to reach protected objects within the required response time, conduct patrols proportionate to risk levels, respond to disturbances, and support contingency operations. Where limitations in vehicle availability cause high-risk objects to receive inadequate responses, a gap arises between the security

⁴⁶ H. Raslin. "Evaluasi Mutu Alat Komunikasi Polri dan Penggelarannya untuk Mendukung Pelaksanaan Tugas Kepolisian dalam Rangka Pengamanan Pemilu 2024." *Jurnal Litbang Polri* 27, no. 1 (2024): 55–73. <https://doi.org/10.46976/litbangpolri.v27i1.236>.

requirements contemplated by Article 6 and the operational capacity available to the police.⁴⁷

From a normative perspective, therefore, the availability and reliability of security facilities and infrastructure—including operational vehicles, communication systems, and surveillance technologies—should not be regarded merely as matters of administrative completeness or logistical capacity. They constitute essential instruments for fulfilling the statutory mandate of Polri. Under Articles 13 and 14 of Law Number 2 of 2002, Polri is entrusted with maintaining public security and order and providing protection to the public. In the operational context of Ditpamobvit Polda Maluku, vehicles that are functional but insufficient in number directly affect the institution's ability to perform its preventive and repressive functions comprehensively. Restricted police mobility is therefore not merely an operational obstacle; it may reduce the effectiveness of the state's legal obligation to protect the continuity of vital objects that serve the public interest.⁴⁸

b. Communication Systems

Communication systems occupy a central position in the implementation of police functions because the security of vital objects requires continuous coordination among field officers, command centers, vital-object operators, and relevant institutions. The research identifies the use of handheld radios, radio communication, official telephones, and integrated communication systems, although signal limitations remain in certain areas.

From a legal-operational perspective, weaknesses in communication cannot be regarded merely as technical deficiencies. They may constitute operational barriers to the implementation of early-warning mechanisms and the timely exercise of police authority. The reliability of communication, particularly during emergencies, is therefore a significant indicator of whether information concerning a threat can be transmitted promptly and accurately to the authorities legally empowered to respond. Delayed responses resulting from communication failures may weaken the state's capacity to prevent and address disturbances affecting vital objects.

Accordingly, the effectiveness of communication infrastructure should not be measured simply by the existence of communication devices. Rather, it should be assessed by their reliability, continuity, coverage, and responsiveness, particularly under emergency and contingency conditions.

c. CCTV and Surveillance Technology

CCTV and other surveillance technologies function as instruments for monitoring, early detection, access control, and, where appropriate, documentation that may subsequently support law-enforcement processes. The research indicates that many vital objects have adopted CCTV systems, although the quality, coverage, and integration of these systems remain uneven.

⁴⁷ Josua Valen Siahaya, Yanti Amelia Lewerissa, and Jetty Martje Patty, "Kekerasan Fisik Yang Dilakukan Oleh Anggota Polri Terhadap Masyarakat," *TATOHI: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 4, no. 9 (November 2024): 765–773, <https://doi.org/10.47268/tatohi.v4i9.2496>

⁴⁸ Wahyu Thovyan, Johanis S. V. Peilouw, and Yanti A. Lewerissa. "Penegakan Hukum dalam Melindungi Sumber Kekayaan Alam Laut dan Akibat Hukumnya Menurut UNCLOS 1982." *Pattimura Law Study Review* 1, no. 1 (2023).

From a normative perspective, however, CCTV should not be characterized as a universal statutory requirement expressly imposed by Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004. The Decree instead establishes a broader framework concerning the determination of standard security configurations, personnel strength, security facilities and infrastructure, and periodic security-system audits. Accordingly, CCTV may constitute part of an object's security configuration where its deployment is justified by the applicable security standards and the risk profile of the particular object.

This distinction is important to prevent technical security practices from being inaccurately transformed into express legal obligations. The relevant legal question is not simply whether CCTV exists, but whether the surveillance system is proportionate to the identified threat and vulnerability, capable of supporting early detection, and integrated into an effective response mechanism.

d. Security Posts and Security Equipment

Security posts, inspection equipment, communication devices, alarms, access-control systems, and other supporting facilities constitute components of the physical security system. Their effectiveness must be evaluated in relation to the overall security architecture of the relevant vital object. In this respect, Article 5 of Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004 provides a normative basis for the operator and Polri to determine the standard security configuration, including personnel strength and security facilities and infrastructure, and to conduct periodic security-system audits. Consequently, the adequacy of security facilities should be assessed against the security requirements identified through the applicable security assessment rather than through a uniform standard applicable to every object.

Where an audit identifies deficiencies in fencing, security posts, lighting, access control, or other security facilities but corrective measures are not implemented, the resulting problem should not be characterized merely as a shortage of facilities. It may instead indicate an implementation gap between the legally established security framework and its practical realization.

e. Early-Warning System and Risk-Based Security

An effective security system must not merely respond to disturbances after they occur but should also identify and prevent threats before they develop into more serious disruptions. The research indicates that Ditpamobvit undertakes threat identification, vulnerability mapping, vulnerability analysis, and security planning. These practices have a direct relationship with Article 6 of Presidential Decree Number 63 of 2004, which requires police deployment to be based on operational needs and assessments of potential threats and/or disturbances. Accordingly, risk assessment is not merely a managerial technique but an important mechanism for translating legal requirements into operational security decisions.

Under this approach, threats and vulnerabilities must first be identified and assessed before determining the required personnel, vehicles, surveillance technologies, communication systems, patrol patterns, and coordination mechanisms. Where a high-risk object receives security resources that are disproportionate to its identified threat level, a gap may exist between the normative security requirement under Article 6 and its practical implementation.

f. Geographical Constraints in Ambon and Maluku

The geographical characteristics of Maluku as an archipelagic region constitute a factor directly affecting the effectiveness of security infrastructure. Distance between locations, accessibility, the distribution of vital objects, and limitations in communication networks may influence response times and patrol capacity.⁴⁹ From the perspective of legal effectiveness, geographical conditions do not eliminate the obligation of Polri to perform its security functions. Rather, such conditions should constitute part of the risk assessment used to determine the appropriate allocation of personnel, vehicles, patrol patterns, communication infrastructure, and other security resources. Consequently, effectiveness standards cannot be applied mechanically without considering the geographical characteristics of the area being secured. A high-risk object located in an area with difficult access and limited communications may require different resources from an object situated in an area with readily available transportation and communication networks.⁵⁰

Comparative and Doctrinal Calibration

A central doctrinal correction is to separate primary internal-security duties from Polri's public-security, assistance, supervision, and law-enforcement functions. Deficiencies in access control, internal guards, alarms, or operator-owned surveillance infrastructure cannot automatically be attributed to Polri; conversely, the operator's primary role does not remove Polri's statutory responsibility to respond to crime, public-order threats, or escalated security risks.

The concept of effectiveness is therefore operationalized normatively through correspondence: authority must match responsibility, resources must match assessed threats, and coordination arrangements must match the geographical and communication constraints of the security environment. Critical-infrastructure scholarship reinforces the need for continuous risk assessment, resilience planning, interoperable communication, and clear public-private responsibility rather than a purely headcount-based concept of security capacity.

The existing table should be presented as a normative responsibility matrix. Its purpose is to show which security functions belong primarily to the operator, which belong to Polri, and which require coordination; it should not be read as field evidence that any institution has actually achieved a specified level of performance.

CONCLUSION

The legal architecture for National Vital Object security is based on proportionally shared responsibility. Operators retain primary responsibility for internal security systems and infrastructure, while Polri provides public-security assistance, law enforcement, supervision, and escalated response within its statutory authority. Because this is a normative study, the article does not claim to have empirically measured the effectiveness of Polri units in Ambon. Its conclusion is instead legal and institutional: security effectiveness should be assessed by the alignment between authority, duty, threat level, operational resources,

⁴⁹ Wardis Girsang et al., *The Island of Ambon: Coexistence, Nature and People* (Yogyakarta: Deepublish, 2025), <https://deepublishstore.com/ebook/e-book-the-island-of-ambon-coexistence-nature-and-people/>

⁵⁰ Yanti Amelia Lewerissa, "Kebijakan Kriminal Perburuan Burung Wallacea di Kepulauan Aru," *SASI* 27, no. 3 (2021): 303–313, <https://doi.org/10.47268/sasi.v27i3.310>

interoperability, and geographical conditions. In an archipelagic environment, mobility and communication constraints are legally relevant to risk-based resource planning. The recommended approach is therefore periodic threat assessment, clear allocation of procurement and maintenance duties, interoperable communications, joint exercises, and auditable coordination protocols between operators and Polri.

Limitation and future research: because this article is normative, claims about implementation, prevalence, user behavior, institutional performance, or causal effectiveness require separate empirical study. Future research should test the proposed framework through systematic case-law coding, institutional data, stakeholder interviews, or comparative regulatory evaluation.

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